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Abstract
Little is known about residential electricity demand in developing countries. In order to shed some light on this topic,
this study combines data from South Africa’s recent Income and Expenditure Survey with data from the National
Energy Regulator of South Africa to estimate the determinants of residential energy demand. Combining electricity
tariff data from the regulator with expenditure survey data from households provides an opportunity to explore the
determinants of the demand for electricity. Due to the largenumber of zeroes in the dataset, a two-part model is
employed. The results indicate that household income and electricity price are major demand determinants, and for


















elasticities. We also find that access to free basic electricity, a policy
designed to improve access to electricity does what is expected. It is associated with increases in the probability
that households purchase electricity and reduces total expenditure on electricity. Household demand is also higher
for appliance-rich households in urban areas, especially if there are more household members and they live in larger
dwellings.
Keywords: Electricity; Household; Two-part model; South Africa
JEL classification: Q41, Q48
1. Introduction
With increasing economic development, energy consumptionin South Africa has risen. This rise has been driven
by two separate components. Firstly, following the end of apartheid, the government committed to electrification.
Dinkelman (2011) notes that at least two million households(close to one-quarter of the total) were connected to the
grid by 2001, which was much faster than the roll-out achievements by the US under President Roosevelt’s Rural
Electrification Act. Thus, more people had access to electricity than before, and, as underscored by Dinkelman
(2011), the roll-out could be tied to the economic development achievements in the country. Secondly, South Africa’s
economic output relies heavily on primary industries (Kohler, 2014), such as mining, which are energy intensive,
and, although output in those sectors has been cyclical, it has generally increased over the last decade in order to fuel
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development in China. These two features, along with the fact th t investment in new generation capacity dropped to
zero between 2002 and 2006 (Bayliss, 2008), led to a severe engy crisis in 2008 (Bayliss, 2008; Gaunt, 2008).
To mitigate that energy crisis, Eskom, the state utility, planned in 2005 to expand its generation capacity by
17 120 MW (megawatts).1 However, such expansion does not come online quickly. Thus,in addition to expansions
in supply, a variety of energy efficiency and demand side management (EEDSM) activities were put in place, many
focused on the residential sector, to reduce both peak demand and overall electricity consumption. Although research
is underway to examine the eff ctiveness of these interventions, a spate of rolling blackouts in January and February
of 2015 suggest that these strategies have not been entirelyeff ctive. Possibly, effectiveness could be improved, if the
strategies were targeted more carefully, which requires a better understanding of the end-users. In this research, we
focus on one electricity end-user, the residential sector,and we examine the determinants of electricity usage in an
effort to highlight potential avenues for intervention to potentially curb residential sector electricity consumption.
Compared to other sectors, energy consumption patterns in the residential sector are more complicated. House-
holds are decentralised decision-making units, and come inall shapes and sizes. Energy consumption patterns differ
from one household to another, potentially affected by economic, socio-demographic, geographic and physical char-
acteristics. Furthermore, uncertainties associated withhuman behaviour naturally pose challenges, when considering
programmes and policies that might be implemented in the residential sector.2 Thus, household electricity usage
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Brounen et al. (2012) indicate that residential consumption varies with household income and family
composition. Meanwhile,lifestylecould reflect social and behavioural patterns associated with appliance use (San-
quist et al., 2012), and, therefore, the stock of electric appli nces is associated with increased electricity consump-
tion (O’Doherty et al., 2008; McLoughlin et al., 2012; Bediret al., 2013). Dwelling physical factors (i.e., building type,
size, thermal and quality characteristics) are related to household energy consumption (Tso and Yau, 2003; Brounen
et al., 2012). Regional differences also matter; Niu et al. (2012) find that high-income urban residents consume more
electricity than low-income rural households, while otherregional characteristics also matter (Hondroyiannis, 2004;
Narayan and Smyth, 2005). With the exception of Niu et al. (2012) and Tso and Yau (2003), who consider China, the
previously listed research is taken from developed countries.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that prices and income are not the only determinants of electricity usage.
1Eskom website:http://www.eskom.co.za/OurCompany/CompanyInformation/Pages/Company_Information_1.aspx. The ex-
pansion target is to be achieved with one pumped-storage andtwo coal-fired power stations, together with one wind farm and concentrated
solar-thermal station. However, the partial focus on coal-fired solutions has raised a number of concerns over pollution externalities (Nkambule
and Blignaut, 2012; Riekert and Koch, 2012).
2In South Africa, electricity is the main energy source for household use (Stats SA, 2012a), while consuming about 25% of total energy in
2012 (DOE, 2016); this proportion has likely increased, dueto further progress in the National Electrification Programme (Bekker et al., 2008),
increased appliance affordability and increasingly wealthy households (even though appliances are becoming more efficient in their own right).
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Therefore, we accessed tariff data from the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) and merged it
with the 2010/2011 South African Income and Expenditure Survey (SA IES, Stats SA, 2012b), which resulted in a
database that is nationally representative and includes price variation, as well as other potential economic and socio-
demographic determinants of electricity demand. We use this combined data to examine the standard features of
demand, income and price eff cts, while controlling for additional factors in our effort to highlight potential avenues
for intervention in the residential sector. The breadth of the SA IES questions, along with the approach taken to merge
price data, offers an opportunity to analyse household electricity consumption, inclusive of many household-level
variables.
We are not the first to use expenditure data, although most examples in the literature come from developed coun-
tries. For example, Barnes et al. (1981), Branch (1993) and Fell et al. (2014) use the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey from different periods to estimate price/income elasticities of demand for residential electricity, while Halvorsen
and Larsen (2001) examine factors affecting growth in Norwegian household demand from 1976 to 1993 using that
country’s annual consumer expenditure survey. One developing country exception is Anderson (2004) who under-
takes a similar analysis (combining SA IES data and regulator price data) in South Africa, focusing only on prepaid
electricity users. That analysis, based on the year 2000 data, is in need of updating, partly to determine whether or not
residential consumers became more price-conscious after the 2008 electricity crisis experience. We also extend that
analysis, including additional types of electricity consumers, using a larger set of electric appliances and accounting
for Free Basic Electricity (FBE, a program designed to improve access to electricity for low-income South Africans).3
Using the SA IES data, unfortunately, comes with additionalissues. One advantage is the availability of household-
level income, expenditure and demographic information; however, it rarely includes price information; thus, as noted,
a secondary source of price variation is needed, which we accss fromtheNERSA, albeit at a regional level. Further-
more, expenditure data in a country like South Africa, wheresome households access FBE and some grid-connected
households do not actually report using electricity, include a fair share of zero observations. Thus, for the analysis,a
two-part model (2PM) is applied to take account of two separate features: the probability that a connected household
actually reports electricity consumption and the consumption of electricity, conditional on purchase.
Although economic theory argues that consumer behaviour isaffected at the margin, and, therefore, consumers
should respond to marginal changes in the price, householdsreceive their electricity billsex-post, typically for at
least one month of use;4 thus, behavioural responses may be easier to measure with average prices (Fell et al., 2014;
Ito, 2014). One measure of an average, and the one we incorporate is the area-level price. As noted by Branch
(1993) and Halvorsen and Larsen (2001), who use municipal-level prices, doing so is synonymous to assuming that
households in the same municipality face the same electricity price. On the other hand, Alberini and Filippini (2011)
3A number of households receive free basic electricity (FBE), described in Section 2, and may choose not to purchase beyond their free
allotment. Finally, there is evidence that 0.9% of Eskom generated electricity is stolen at the residential level, and,therefore, usage may not be
reported by households with access, but do not pay for their electricity (Source:http://www.esi-africa.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
05/Maboe-Maphaka.pdf).
4In South Africa, electricity meters are read only every other month in a number of municipalities to keep costs down, while electricity bills are
“estimated” in a less than completely transparent fashion.
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use the average prices of a given electric utility, instead of household-level price; their data are from the American
Housing Survey. The South African situation is rather similar; due to local-level control over distribution, end-user
prices are regional, and households in those regions face the same tariff structure. Fortunately, the SA IES includes
appropriate information to match the household to their local-level electricity distributor, which allows us to assign
them a regulator-approved tariff.
The South African literature on electricity consumption – see Table 1 – has, nearly exclusively, made use of
time series data and generally ignored the residential sector. The available time series data are used to forecast
residential (Ziramba, 2008), industrial (Inglesi-Lotz, 2014) or aggregated (Pouris, 1987; Amusa et al., 2009; Inglesi,
2010; Inglesi-Lotz and Blignaut, 2011) electricity demandi South Africa, although Inglesi-Lotz and Blignaut (2011)
decompose South Africa’s electricity consumption across non-residential sectors. Regardless of the sector considered,
none of these time series studies are able to incorporate mordetailed information about the end-users in that sector.
Table 1 about here
The exceptions to the time series focus are Louw et al. (2008), Anderson (2004), described earlier, and Jack and
Smith (2015). Louw et al. (2008) examine factors affecting electricity usage decisions in low-income households from


























































Unfortunately, they neither include electricity price data in their final analysis nor uncover
any price effects
:::::::::::::::
(Louw et al., 2008). Jack and Smith (2015) use customer transaction data from the City of Cape
Town combined with property value records. They focus on prepaid electricity users, while examining the relationship
between property value and electricity purchasing patterns. They find fewer monthly prepaid purchases, but greater
total expenditure, for higher value properties, suggesting that prepaid electricity meters introduce flexibility, allowing
liquidity constrained households to purchase electricity(Jack and Smith, 2015). By incorporating price information,
more detailed household-level data, and accessing relativly recent data, our research is able to complement these
studies. In particular, we examine the contribution of economic and socio-demographic factors to electricity demand
in South Africa, while providing one of the first studies undertaken in a context marred by severe electricity supply
concerns.
The results of the analysis are supportive of price and income inelasticity, as was expected. Our estimated in-
come elasticity is0.130
:::::
0.128, while the estimated price elasticity is-0.888
:::::
-0.305. Furthermore, a number of socio-
demographic, geographic and physical factors also influence household electricity consumption, as well as the es-
timated elasticities. These factors include various dimensions of wealth and potential energy need. The significant
impacts of these determinants offer implications for energy policies. First of all, increasing the price may not be the
most effective reduction strategy, due to inelastic demand. Second, it is necessary to consider other relevant factors,
when designing energy efficiency programmes/policies. For example, energy efficiency programmes could be tailored
for different population groups in different areas. In addition, energy efficiency improvement could be incorporated
into poverty alleviation targets.
4
2. South African Residential Energy Consumption
South Africa (a newly industrialised country according to the World Bank) is energy-intensive, because its main in-
dustry, minerals extraction and processing, along with historically low energy prices, have likely provided little incen-
tive to save energy. Eskom’s average residential electricity tariff was ZAR 0.40/kWh (kWh: kilowatt hour; ZAR 0.40
≈0.06 USD; USD 1=ZAR 6.35) in 2005/2006 (Newbery and Eberhard, 2008) and ZAR 0.606/kWh (≈0.08 USD;
USD 1=ZAR 7.25) in 2010/2011 (Eskom, 2011), respectively. However, an electricityrisis in 2008 had a number
of effects. An amount of R60 billion was allocated to support Eskom’s capital financing requirements over the fore-
seeable future, and to support energy efficiency and increased renewable energy sourcing (National Tre sury, 2008).
The crisis also led Eskom to propose and NERSA to accept annual electricity tariff increases between 16% and 25%
for households in South Africa (DOE, 2012b); the National Energy Efficiency Strategy argued that the low price of
energy was a significant barrier to energy efficiency (DOE, 2012a). In addition, consumers began to understand that
generation capacity in South Africa was constrained. DOE (2012b) survey evidence implies that a large proportion
of households are aware of basic energy-saving methods; 75%of households are aware that switching off lights when
leaving the house is energy saving, while half of the households claim to undertake this action. Furthermore, 40% of
households are aware that switching off the geyser at certain times during the day or night results inenergy savings,
while 15% claim to take that action.
According to our survey data, approximately 71.5% of households consume electricity, but only 1.1% usenatural
gas (including gas supplied through either a public networkor purchased in cylinders; thelatterpurchasesareprimarily
for spaceheatersandgasgrills); 11.7% and 11.6% use liquid and solid fuels, respectively.The percentage of house-
holds that use electricity for cooking increased from 57.9%in 2002 to 73.1% in 2011 (Stats SA, 2012d).Givenboth
the largeproportionof householdsusingelectricity for daily activities,aswell asthe lack of informationrelatedto
priceson alternativesourcesof electricity,we do not pursuenon-electricenergyoptions. Possibly, the biggest effi-
ciency problem relates to heating water, i.e, water heater/geyser inefficiency. Water-heating contributes 40%-50% of
monthly electricity consumption in the residential sector(Meyer, 2000).
In an effort to alleviate constraints on electricity availability,a series of EEDSM projects have been promoted
by the South African government and Eskom. For instance, a large-scale solar water heating rebate programme was
initiated in 2009 to encourage households to switch to solarwater heating.5 In addition, a residential heat pump
rebate programme was run from 2011 with a similar goal: reducthe load associated with residential water heating.6




in households, a number of large-scale lighting retrofit
projects aiming to reduce the residential lighting load have lso been implemented in South Africa (Ye et al., 2013,
2014). De la Rue du Can et al. (2013) present evidence that theresidential sector has delivered 76% (2 333 MW) of




all peak demand savings. The improvement resulted mainly from mass roll-outs of compact fluorescent lamps (CFL);
over 53 million incandescent bulbs were replaced with more effici nt CFL bulbs.
Despite these improvements, South Africa was back in electricity crisis mode in 2014. Rolling scheduled blackouts
occurred from early November 2014 through mid February 2015.7 This spate of power cuts was the worst since
the 2008 crisis (http://ewn.co.za/2014/12/08/Eskom-ceo-apologises-for-load-shedding). Despite the
electricity capacity expansion programme, launched in 2005, Medupi and Kusile, the initial coal-fired power plants in
the plan, were many years behind schedule.8 In the meantime, most of the power stations are approaching te end of
their lifespan, resulting in substantial operational inefficiencies (De la Rue du Can et al., 2013).
Electricity generation capacity is and has been constrained i South Africa for a number of years, and, although
there are programmes in place to try to reduce demand throughimprovements in energy efficiency, primarily within
the residential sector, it is also true that electricity prices are going to rise over the next few years. Therefore, to provide
additional information that could help in both policy formulation and in designing additional EEDSM programmes
(or redesigning current ones), an improved understanding of the determinants of household electricity consumption is
necessary.
Even though improving energy efficiency is an urgent need, South Africa’s history also affects electricity demand.
Too many poor households have no access to basic services, suh a water, sanitation and electricity; a recent study
(Harris et al., 2017) argues that changes in household electricity access are closely related to household formation and
dissolution dynamics in South Africa. As part of the National I digent Policy (DPLG, 2009), which aims at poverty
alleviation, the FBE policy has been in place, since 2003 (DME, 2003). Although FBE is meant to cover the entire
country, it is not implemented in the same way in every municipality. Behind the policy lies the desire to provide
50 kWh of electricity per month to poor households (DME, 2003). Figure 1 shows the proportion of consumer units
receiving FBE services from municipalities and service providers over the period 2010 and 2011 (Stats SA, 2012c).9
As can be seen in Figure 1, there are regional differences with respect to FBE provision between 2010 and 2011.
Figure 1 about here
A total of 870 GWh (Gigawatt hour) of FBE was consumed in the 2014/2015 financial year (NERSA, 2015).
Given that total electricity consumption in South Africa is204 163 GWh (Eskom, 2015), FBEcontributes
::::::::
consumes
0.4% of total electricity. Although only a small percentageof the total, FBE access (as seen in Figure 1) is high.
However, the proportion of those receiving FBE dropped from2010 to 2011, due to a change in the FBE access
7Load shedding can be traced to the collapse of a coal storage silo at the Majuba power station in Mpumalanga (http://www.citypress.
co.za/business/eskom-silo-collapse-unexpected-matona/), while the breakdown of two Eskom generators made the conditi worse
(http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/energy/2015/01/08/failures-take-eskom-to-load-shedding-brink).
8Construction on Medupi power station started in May 2007 (Eskom, 2007). The first unit was scheduled to come into service early in
2011, and six units totalling 4 500 MW were to be online by 2015. Medupi produced its first power from the beginning of March 2015 (http:
//www.fin24.com/Economy/Medupi-produces-its-first-power-20150302). Kusile power station Unit 1 was scheduled for operation in
early 2017 (Eskom, 2014), but has not yet produced any electricity.
9Figure 1 is not necessarily comparable with the SA IES data, because: (1) The data come from municipalities instead of households; (2) Most
municipalities can not identify multiple households served by one billing unit or delivery point (hence, “consumer units” nstead of “households”
underpin the data); and (3) The reporting period is 1 July, 2010, to 30 June, 2011, which is different from the SA IES we use.
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mechanisms; access became self-targeting, technical or geog aphical, rather than broad-based (Stats SA, 2012c). In
other words, FBE is provided at different levels by different methods over time and space. According to Stats SA
(2012c), more than 70% of municipalities provide FBE at the standard level – 50 kWh, while 8% supply FBE at other
levels. A recent NERSA report (NERSA, 2015) indicates that in the 2014/2015 financial year, 88% of municipalities
supply 50 kWh FBE; but 250 kWh, 150 kWh, 100 kWh, 80 kWh, 75 kWh,70 kWh, 65 kWh and 60 kWh are also
offered. Additionally, some municipalities provide FBE to allresidential consumers, regardless of household income
and electricity consumption. For example, Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipality provided 100 kWh of FBE to all
residential Tariff A consumers in 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 financial years (Ekurhuleni, 2008).10 On the other hand,
and more in line with the goal of FBE, some municipalities only provide FBE if the household is registered in the
indigent programme, and changed to prepaid meters.
3. Data
3.1. Data Description
This study uses data from the SA IES 2010/2011 conducted by Statistics South Africa from September 2010 to
August 2011 (Stats SA, 2012b). The SA IES is a cross-sectional survey conducted every five years. Its sampling
frame is based on the master sample of South African census enumeration areas; in this case, the 2001 Population
Census enumeration areas, as the 2011 Census frame was not ready at that time. The SA IES 2010/2011 data provide
detailed income, expenditure and demographic informationon 25 328 households throughout South Africa. Personal
level information (like age, gender, race, marital status,occupation, employment status and income of each person in
a household) is also available. However, our focus is on the head of the household, when compiling this information
for each household. After merging the information togetheracross the different survey files, only 25 015 household
samples remained. In some households, there was no clear indicat on of the head; we also removed the households in
which the head was younger than 15.
For the present analysis, only households connected to the electricity grid are considered – out of the 25 015 house-
holds, 22 106 are grid-connected (88.37%) and 2 861 are not cone ted (11.44%), while 48 (0.19%) are unspecified.
Unfortunately, in a number of cases, it was also not possibleto s parate electricity cost from water cost; a number of
municipalities present customers with a consolidated bill. In a number of additional cases, survey respondents are not
responsible for their own electricity accounts, and, thus,they did not report separate electricity expenditures. These
households were also removed from the analysis. Missing data on important variables, such as education, access to
piped water and flush toilets, dwelling type, receipt of FBE,ownership of property and appliances etc., resulted in
a final effective sample of 16 851; 8 164 households out of 25 015 have been dropped. To see if dropping appears
to be selective, and, thus might affect the empirical analysis, we compare the means across the retained and dropped
10Tariff A is a lower-end use tariff plan, and is available for single-phase 230 V and multiphase400/230 V connections with a capacity of up to
80 A per phase. This tariff suits low consumption domestic and micro business customers (Ekurhuleni, 2008).
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samples, as shown in Table A1. Although there are differences, the means from the separated samples fall within one
standard deviation of the other sample’s means, and, thus, dropping these observations is unlikely to have a strong
influence on the reported results.
Although the number of household controls available is an advantage, the SA IES 2010/2011 does not include in-
formation on electricity prices. To accommodate this limitation,theNERSA approved municipal tariffs for 2010/2011
have been used in this study. According to the NERSA tariff database, the municipal electricity tariff for 2010/2011
is regulated for indigent, prepaid and conventional metering households, separately. The indigent tariff is applied for
poor households, who have been registered in the National Indige t Policy programme; the prepaid tariff is applied
for prepaid meter households, while the rest are subject to conventional tariffs. The SA IES dataset includes a unique
identification (ID) number for each household, and the first three digits of the ID indicate the municipality in which
the household resides,11 but the data do not indicate who is registered in the NationalI digent Database. In other
words, it is possible to match the appropriate NERSA approved municipal tariff for 2010/2011 to the household based
on an assumption about indigents. Thus, we assign the indiget tariff to households who receive only FBE; there are
























assignedconventional tariffs. For those
missing municipalities in the NERSA approved tariff list, we use tariffsof
::::
from district municipalities instead.
In the SA IES 2010/2011, electricity expenditure for each household is captured in four separate columns: “water
and electricity”, “electricity”, “prepaid” and “free basic electricity”.




possibleto split electricity out of the bill, these households are dropped.










• “free basic electricity” (FBE): for households whose utility bill reports the value of FBE.
This information underscores the description in Table 2 formatching the NERSA tariff to each household.
Table 2 about here
In addition to the different tariff groups, there are three types of tariff structures according to the NERSA approved
tariff list for 2010/2011: the single rate, the single rate with a basic charge andthe incline block tariff (IBT) (Ta-














63% of the households
are assigned the approved single tariff. A few municipalities apply a single electricity rate with ab sic charge – to
recover distribution and billing-related costs (including the electrical distribution system, the meter, postage, customer
11The electricity supplier for residential customers is eithr Eskom or municipality in South Africa. In the SA IES data, it is not possible to






theEskom tariff during the matching process.
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record-keeping, meter servicing and reading). 3 019 households (12%) face this tariff structure. The IBT mechanism
divides electricity prices into several blocks, and, thus,is a nonlinear tariff; the first block of electricity is priced low-
est, and there are 2-4 blocks. Roughly 19% of the licensed municipalities have implemented this tariff structure (DOE,
2011). For households in municipalities following the IBT,we assign the average of the approved tariffs across all of
the blocks, as a proxy for the average domestic tariff these households face (25% of households). We also created a




anonlinear tariff structure: the IBT or a single rate with a basic charge.
Table 3 about here
The SA IES does not capture electricity consumption in kWh. Rather, the survey captures expenses on electricity
for each household. Therefore, we take electricity expenditure as
:::
our dependent variable and calculate the price and
























































































theSA IES 2010/2011 took
place over a period of twelve months, all reported expenditure data have been inflated/deflated to March 2011 prices
using the consumer price index (CPI).
3.2. Variables
The variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 4. The dep ndent variable is monthly household electricity
expenditure, whilenonlinearis the binary indicator for nonlinear tariff structure. The SA IES 2010/2011 data captured
the value of FBE, or the amount of money FBE is worth, for households, whose utility bill indicates the value of FBE
received, although no payment for the “value”. Since the FBEis recorded and counted as both in-kind income and in-
kind consumption for the household, the FBE value has not been incorporated into household electricity consumption






















































































Table 4 about here
As implied from our preceding discussions, a number of household-level variables are also included. For ex-
ample, we include socio-demographic characteristics (like age, gender, race and the highest level of education level










































































































































































13We also incorporated reported FBE values into the calculation of household electricity expenditure in a further analysis. There are no evident



























































dwelling, dwelling type, settlement type, access to piped water and a flush toilet, as well as ownership of the dwelling.
Additional variables included relate to concepts of energyneed, as well as wealth. For example, we consider the own-
ership of electrical appliances listed in the survey: radio, stereo/HiFi, television set, DVD (digital video disc) player,
refrigerator/freezer, stove,15 microwave oven, washing machine, computer, camera, cellphone, landline phone, DStv
(digital satellite television), internet service and power driven tools. Considering climate conditions are also energy
consumption drivers, we includewinter andsummerindicators to capture seasonal fluctuations in electricityon-
sumption. Finally, in order to consider provincial differences in electricity consumption, provincial dummy variables
are included.
4. Methodology





electricity price and household income are indispensable factors to be considered.
In terms of household electricity consumption, a consumer’s preference can be represented by variables related to
household electricity consumption behaviours. Householdelectricity demand is modeled as
Y = f (p, I , F,
:
D,H), (1)


























H represents variables related to the dwelling.
The econometric model used in this analysis considers the presence of zero electricity consumption expenditure
households in the data, but only considers households conneted to the grid and able to access electricity. Roughly





reasons: the household is connected but can not aff rd electricity;and the household has received FBE, does not
want/need to consume more electricity, and we record their expenditure as zero. Out of the 948 households with zero





observed and represent actual outcomes, rather than representing missing values or potential outcomes. According to
Dow and Norton (2003), a two-part model (2PM) is appropriatein this case.
The 2PM separates the dependent variable into two parts: “Y > 0” and “Y|Y > 0” (Duan et al., 1983, 1984).
For the first part, we assume a standard probit for the probability the household has positive electricity consumption
expenditure
Pr[Y > 0|X] = Φ(Xβ1), (2)
15Unfortunately, stove includes gas, electric or paraffin style stove, and it is not possible to separate them. However, as already noted, only a
small portion of households record expenditures on gas (1%)and/or paraffin (7.8%); hence we are willing to assume a stove is more than likely
electric. Furthermore, stove ownership does, at least partially relate to household wealth, and, therefore it should be included.
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where Pr[·] denotes probability;Φ(·) is the Cumulative Normal Distribution Function (CDF);Y > 0 is a binary
indicator for positive electricity consumption expenditure. X is a vector of independent variables, which affect the
probability of household electricity consumption, andβ1 is a vector of associated parameters to be estimated.
The second part is specified as an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the logged dependent variable
ln(Y|Y > 0,X), conducted on the electricity consuming subset.
E[Y|Y > 0,X] = Xβ2 + E[ε|Y > 0,X], (3)
whereX is the same vector of independent variables for Eq. (2);β2 is a vector of associated parameter estimates;ε is
an error term. Following Dow and Norton (2003), normal homoskedastic errorsε and E[ε|Y > 0,X] = 0 are assumed.
We use the STATA command, “twopm” (Belotti et al., 2015), to calculate marginal effects of the 2PM. In our setting,
which has stratified random sampling, we need to apply a nonparametric bootstrap to calculate the standard errors
for marginal effects of the 2PM (Belotti et al., 2015). However, it should be noted that the second part is based on
ln Y = ln p+ ln q; we observe both expenditure (Y) and local prices (p), but not the quantity (q). There are two features
to keep in mind in this setting. First,q is expected to fall when prices rise; therefore, an increasein price will only
raise total expenditure, if the quantity does not fall fast enough (i.e., if the price elasticity is less than one). Second, the
price elasticity of demand, conditional on positive electricity expenditure, is given byβ2,ln p − 1,16 while the income
elasticity of conditional demand is given byβ2,ln I . Furthermore, the marginal eff cts in the full model are based on
re-transformed data, i.e.,Y such that the marginal eff ct of, for example, lnp or ln I , are expenditure semi-elasticities,
rather than demand elasticities.
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Prices and Incomes
Our primary interest is in the price and income elasticitiesof electricity demand; thus, we focus on those results
for the 2PM, which are available in Table 5. This table contains three sets of estimates: one for all households and
two for a reduced set of households. The reduction in numbers, as noted in the data section, is primarily due to the
use of additional controls, grid connection and access to FBE. Thus, the two reduced sample estimates allow us to
compare the elasticities with and without additional contrls. The results of the second-stage OLS (Columns (3)-(4) of
Table 5) outline the effects of price and income on conditional electricity demand.They show that electricity demand
is normal, but income inelastic. Income elasticity falls from approximately 0.4, when there are no controls
:
, to 0.1,
when additional household controls are included. Furthermore, conditional electricity demand is reduced by higher
prices, but the reduction is not always elastic. For the entir sample, an increase in the price of 10% is expected to

























and, therefore, are not expected to be representative of electricity demand. After eliminating such households, a 10%
increase in the price of electricity is expected to reduce its demand by 11.6%. Once additional household controls
are included, the price elasticity drops; a 10% increase in the price is expected to reduce demand by 8.9%. The price
elasticity suggests that consumption does respond to prices; however, the household sector is found to have inelastic
demand, once the full set of controls are incorporated. Our results suggest that despite the fact that households in our
sample were recently subjected to an electricity crisis, price- esponsiveness has fallen; Anderson (2004) estimatedan
elasticity of -1.35 using data from the year 2000. However, as we discuss below, that can be at least partly attributable
to the availability of FBE.
Table 5 about here.
Despite these general results, households in South Africa ae more likely to buy electricity in areas with higher
prices, as shown in Columns (1)-(2) of Table 5 – results that are also in agreement with Anderson (2004). For all
estimation samples, prices are higher for those purchasingelectricity than those who do not; see Table 6. Specifically,
consistent with Jack and Smith (2015), who note that a large poportion of residential electricity connections use
prepaid meters, households accessing power via prepaid units dominate the sample. Furthermore, they face the highest
average price, while those with conventional electricity –hose who purchase their electricity post-pay – face a lower
price; see Table 7. That difference translates into the differences seen in Table 6. However, we did undertake further
investigation, thinking the difference might be location dependent: electricity prices might be higher in wealthier
areas that are also more likely to purchase electricity. Thus, we re-ran the model with area-specific controls related
to household characteristics, such as income, wealth and education – specifically, we included local-level means of
all control variables – in order to account for possible correlation between prices and municipality attributes. Those
results, shown in Table A2, suggest there is some correlation between price and municipal attributes, and that they
affect both the probability of purchase and conditional demand. However, they do not change the signs or values in
any meaningful way.
Tables 6 and 7 about here.
Previous research in South Africa – see Table 1 – finds income elasticities ranging from 0 to 1.673 and price
elasticities ranging from−1.35 to 0.298, although these studies are not only focused upon residential lectricity
consumption. Internationally, a smaller spread in elasticities is observed in the literature; income elasticities lie
between 0 and 0.23, see Reiss and White (2005) and Branch (1993), while price elasticities lie between−1.32 (Bernard
et al., 2011) and−0.08 (Alberini and Filippini, 2011). These studies, unlike thir South African counterparts, are only
for the residential sector, which probably explains the smaller spread in values. Our estimates lie within the ranges
observed both nationally and internationally.
5.2. Additional Determinants
The marginal effects from the 2PM related to non-price and non-income controls are presented in Table 8. The
nuance in results support our use of the 2PM. Both the nonlinear tariff structure (which we interact with the log of the
12
price) and FBE influence the probability that households purchase electricity and total (log) expenditure, conditional
on purchase. The nonlinear structure reduces the probability of purchase, while FBE increases the probability by 1.6%.
As it is designed to do, FBE reduces (log) expenditure, conditional on purchasing electricity. Despite the opposing
effects in each of the two-parts, the overall effect of FBE is a reduction in electricity expenditure in households. On
the other hand, the nonlinear structure operates in the opposite direction of the electricity price. In other words, price
responsiveness for nonlinear tariff consumers is smaller than for other consumers. Recalling the large proportion of
prepaid households in our sample, along with Jack and Smith’s (2015) assertion that prepaid meters offer improved
flexibility, the result makes sense. Overall, however, the results also suggest that a nonlinear tariff structure works as









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Further, our results suggest that larger households livingn larger urban homes, especially if owned, are more like-
ly to purchase electricity. We also find evidence that appliance ownership, especially radio, TV, refrigerator/freezer
and stove ownership are associated with an increased probability of purchasing electricity. With respect to total con-
sumption on electricity, which we see in Columns (5)-(6) of Table 8, nearly all appliances lead to increased total
13
electricity expenditure, as well as on conditional expenditure (Columns (3) and (4)), although refrigerators/freezers
and stoves have a larger impact on total expenditure, than other appliances. Similarly, as with the probability of pur-
chase, household size, actual size of the dwelling (in number of rooms) and urban locale are associated with increased
expenditure. Given the nature of the analysis, the aforementioned determinants have the same qualitative eff ct on
electricity demand. In other words, electricity demand is higher in appliance-rich large houses and households, but
lower in FBE households and those facing higher average prics in a nonlinear tariff structure area.Finally,households
living in owner-occupiedpropertiesconsumelesselectricity thanthosein rentedaccommodations,possiblybecause
ownersaremorelikely to install energyefficiencyequipment(?) while rentersarelessmotivatedtodoso.
The results related to education were not entirely expected. Each of the estimated marginal effects on the prob-
ability of purchase, which are relative to a non-educated head, is negative, while some – secondary and matric plus
– are statistically significantly so. We expected educationto correlate with wealth and income, and, therefore, be
associated with an increased purchase probability. However, it is important to recall that we have incorporated income
and various measures of wealth, measured by number of rooms and ownership of appliances. Therefore, once we
control for income and appliance-based electricity need, education no longer matters in the probability of purchase.
Furthermore, we see that education is not an important determinant of total expenditure (or conditional expenditure),
once controlling for other factors.
In general, the results across both parts of the 2PM work in opposite directions, see Columns (1)-(4) of Table 8.
In addition to the results already described, the marginal effects ofpipe waterandflush toilet– the household has
access to piped water and flush toilet sanitation – are statistic lly significant under both parts, which means they are
important determinants of both purchase and quantity (conditi al on purchase). However, the full two-part model
estimates (in Columns (5)-(6) of Table 8) are insignificant;thus, the probability of buying and expenditure conditional
on purchase cancel each other in the full model. Differences in estimates across the first and second stage demonstrate
the advantage of the 2PM. It separately takes into account both the decision to buy electricity and the expenditure,
conditional on purchase, because these decision processesmay not be the same.
5.3. Policy Discussion
Unfortunately, South Africa’s apartheid past can be observed in these results. Non-black households consume
more electricity, and that difference is made worse by appliance differences (not reported, but extensive across race
groups). In terms of policy, FBE was designed to partly alleviate inequality in the access to electricity, and, to some
degree, appears to have made at least some difference: increasing access and alleviating the burdens associ ted with
purchase. However, since the FBE policy does not aim to reduce electricity consumption (rather, it aims to increase
it), and the lack of clarity in the data regarding which households may have received FBE, one should be careful,
when interpreting the relationship between FBE and electricity use we found. The racial differences, unfortunately,
are underscored by South Africa’s historical legacy, and they present big challenges.
Because electricity is an important input for the economic growth needed to potentially reverse apartheid’s racial
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differences, and, given the supply limitations discussed previously, there remains a need to reign-in residential demand.
Doing so will expand availability for the primary and secondary production sectors of the economy, and, according
to our results, this might be achieved by (a) focusing attention on efficient electrical appliances, (b) increasing prices
and/or extending access to prepaid meters and (c) increasing thetransparency and focus of the FBE policy.
Electrical appliances were found to increase the demand forelectricity, and, therefore, higher efficiency appliances
are expected to reduce demand; as noted above, De la Rue du Canet al. (2013) present evidence that the residential
sector has delivered 76% (2 333 MW) of all peak demand savings. Similar programs aimed at reducing the purchase
price of energy efficient appliances such as previous solar water heater and residential heat pump rebates would be
expected to further reduce electricity demand and expenditure.
With respect to price, electricity demand is price inelastic, once the full set of household controls are incorporated,
while nonlinear tariffs further reduce price responsiveness. Thus, an alternative that focuses consumer attention on
the price they pay – requiring prepaid meters, for example – is likely to have a larger impact. However, the price
inelastic nature of electricity demand implies that increased prices will increase household expenditure on electricity,
at least for those who purchase, eroding household purchasing power. Given the legacy of apartheid, which led to
wide racial disparities in welfare, electricity price increases could further exacerbate those differences. However, the
post-apartheid government has developed the FBE program tooffset some of those problems. Available data suggest
that this program is not applied in the same manner in all places, and, more concerning, may not even be applied
directly to relatively poorer households. Thus, it is necessary to make FBE more transparent, since it is applied to the
benefit of poor households. If the electricity price keeps increasing, then the FBE will be able to offset that rise in
price.
6. Conclusions
This study investigates the determinants of South African residential electricity consumption in order to shed some
light on the demand for electricity in developing countries. The study is based on data from the SA IES 2010/2011.
The results uncover a wide range of determinants, whose contribution to the probability of buying electricity and
consumption conditional on purchase are often opposite each other. The result that determinants might affect the
probability of purchase in a different direction than conditional purchases supports our use of the two-part model in
this analysis.
Economically, expectations associated with demand were uph ld. In terms of South Africa’s energy problems and
need for economic growth, the results present challenges. Increased growth means increased income, and, therefore,
increased electricity demand at a time when new power generation f cilities are not yet online. Meanwhile, increased
prices are expected to yield consumption reductions with all else equal; yet, price increases may negatively impact
household welfare. Thus, a delicate balance will need to be struck and maintained. We find that the electricity price
and household income are major economic factors, and, for the most part, accord with economic expectations. A
15
higher electricity price contributes to reduced consumption, while electricity is a normal good. Both price and income
elasticities are inelastic, once the full range of additional determinants is incorporated in the model, and are within


















































































































































































Unfortunately, racial differences that can be
tied to South Africa’s historical legacy remain a feature. In addition to this set of expected results, we find that our
measures of electricity need and wealth are important determinants of electricity consumption. Households with more
persons, a larger number of rooms and more appliances (of nearly any kind) are found to spend more on electricity.
Similarly, households residing in urban areas consume moreelectricity than households living elsewhere.
Although a large number of determinants were uncovered, andthe economic expectations associated with demand
were upheld by the research, further research is needed. Theprec ding analysis was limited to those connected to
the grid, partly because households not connected would notgenerally be in a position to use electricity; they would
be unlikely to own appliances, for example. However, as the grid is extended, more households will have access. At
this stage, we are not in a position to say anything about the pot ntial effect of grid extension on overall residential
electricity consumption. Therefore, further research into the effect of rolling out the national electricity grid on
household electricity use, and even other forms of energy, is needed.
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Table 1: Electricity consumption analysis in South Africa.
Source Data and period Price and income elasticities Econometric mod-
el
Pouris (1987) time-series, 1950-1983 LR: income 0.71, price -0.9 Unconstrained dis-
tributed lag model
Anderson (2004) household-level, 2000 income 0.32, price -1.35 Heckman selection
model
Louw et al. (2008) household-level, 1998 income: 0.243 to 0.532 Logarithm OLS
regressing model
Ziramba (2008) time-series, 1978-2005 LR: income 0.31, price -0.04; SR: in-
come 0.3, price -0.02
ARDL bounds
testing approach
Amusa et al. (2009) time-series, 1960-2007 LR: income 1.673, price 0.298 ARDL bounds
testing approach
Inglesi (2010) time-series, 1980-2005 LR: income 0.42, price -0.56 Engle-Granger and
ECM models
Inglesi-Lotz (2011) time-series, 1980-2005 income: 0 to 1,price: -1.077 to -0.045 Kalman filter
Inglesi-Lotz (2014) time-series, 1970-2007 price: -1 to -0.95 Kalman filter
Jack and Smith (2015) household-level, 2014 - -
SR, short-run; LR, long-run.
Table 2: Tariff types by type of payment.
Tariff type Sample size
(1) Elec= 0, Prepaid>0 Prepaid 15 128
(2) Elec= Prepaid= FBE= 0 or Elec> 0 Conventional 9 673
(3) Elec= Prepaid=0, FBE> 0 Indigent 214
Total 25 015
Table 3: Tariff structures according to the NERSA approved list.
Tariff structure Sample size
Linear Single rate 15 844
Nonlinear
Single rate with a basic charge 3 029
Incline block tariff (IBT) 6 142
Total 25 015
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of variables (N =16 851).
Variable name Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Y monthly household electricity consumption expenditure (unit: ZARa) 225.352 335.153 0 10085.5
I monthly household income (unit: ZAR) 8 396.801 13 501.620 0 175 809.8
p electricity price (unit: c/kWhb) 80.506 11.144 27.5 114
nonlinear dummy: 1 if household facing following electricity tariff structure: the
incline block tariff (IBT) or a single rate with a basic charge
0.318 0.466 0 1
fbe dummy: 1 if household has received free basic electricity 0.283 0.450 0 1
Ygas Monthly household gas expenditure, including expenditures on gas sup-
plied through either a public network or purchased in cylinders (including
gas for heating purposes) (unit: ZAR)
2.74 56.59 0 6 047.92
Yliquid Monthly household expenditure on liquid fuels, including exp nditures on
paraffin, petrol and diesel (petrol and diesel for household use, not trans-
port) (unit: ZAR)
7.83 63.88 0 3 276.33
Ysolid Monthly household expenditure on solid fuels, including exp nditures on
candle, firewood bought, coal, charcoal, dung and cropwaste; no includ-
ing fetched firewood and dung values (unit: ZAR)
5.14 43.35 0 1 839.42
dgas dummy: 1 ifYgas> 0 0.01 0.10 0 1
dliquid dummy: 1 ifYliquid > 0 0.08 0.28 0 1
dsolid dummy: 1 ifYsolid > 0 0.08 0.27 0 1
hhsize household size (number of persons in a household) 4.037 2.349 1 21
room total number of rooms in use excluding bathrooms in a household 4.451 2.074 0 18
urban dummy: 1 if household settles in urban formal or urban informal areas 0.628 0.483 0 1
formal dummy: 1 if the type of main dwelling is dwelling/house or brick/concrete
block structure on a separate stand or yard or on a farm; flat orpartment
in a block of flats; cluster house in security complex; town house/semi-
detached house; dwelling/house/flat/room in backyard; room/flatlet on a
property or a larger dwelling, servants quarters/g anny’s flat
0.875 0.331 0 1
traditional dummy: 1 if the type of main dwelling is traditional dwelling/hut/structure
made of traditional materials
0.070 0.255 0 1
informal dummy: 1 if the type of main dwelling is informal dwelling/shack in back-
yard; informal dwelling/shack not in backyard, e.g. in an informal/squatter
settlement or on farm; caravan/tent
0.055 0.228 0 1
owner dummy: 1 if household owns the property 0.896 0.306 0 1
pipe water dummy: 1 if household has access to pipe water 0.867 0.340 0 1
flush toilet dummy: 1 if household has access to flush toilet 0.595 0.491 0 1
winter dummy: 1 if household is interviewed in July, August or Septemb r 0.245 0.430 0 1
summer dummy: 1 if household is interviewed in December, January orFebruary 0.275 0.446 0 1
age age of household head 48.390 15.913 15 95
... continued on next page ...
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Variable name Description Mean Std. Dev Min Max
female dummy: 1 if household head is female 0.459 0.498 0 1
African/Black dummy: 1 if household head is African/Black 0.797 0.402 0 1
Coloured dummy: 1 if household head is Coloured 0.115 0.319 0 1
Indian/Asian dummy: 1 if household head is Indian/Asian 0.015 0.120 0 1
White dummy: 1 if household head is White 0.074 0.261 0 1
no schooling dummy: 1 if household head has no schooling 0.125 0.331 0 1
primary dummy: 1 if the highest level of education that household head success-
fully completed is between Grade 0-7
0.271 0.444 0 1
secondary dummy: 1 if the highest level of education that household head success-
fully completed is between Grade 8-11
0.329 0.470 0 1
matric dummy: 1 if the highest level of education that household head success-
fully completed is Grade 12
0.227 0.419 0 1
matric plus dummy: 1 if the highest level of education that household head successful-
ly completed is higher than Grade 12, e.g. Bachelors, Honours r higher
degree (Masters, PhD)
0.048 0.213 0 1
radio dummy: 1 if household owns radio 0.546 0.498 0 1
stereo/HiFi dummy: 1 if household owns stereo or HiFi 0.301 0.459 0 1
TV dummy: 1 if household owns television set 0.854 0.353 0 1
DVD dummy: 1 if household owns DVD player 0.653 0.476 0 1
refrigerator dummy: 1 if household owns refrigerator or freezer 0.823 0.382 0 1
stove dummy: 1 if household owns gas, electric or paraffin stove 0.908 0.289 0 1
microwave dummy: 1 if household owns microwave oven 0.479 0.500 0 1
washing machine dummy: 1 if household owns washing machine 0.349 0.477 0 1
computer dummy: 1 if household owns computer 0.166 0.372 0 1
camera dummy: 1 if household owns camera 0.115 0.319 0 1
cellphone dummy: 1 if household owns cellphone 0.907 0.290 0 1
telephone dummy: 1 if household owns telephone 0.142 0.349 0 1
DStv dummy: 1 if household owns DStv 0.229 0.420 0 1
internet dummy: 1 if household has internet service 0.060 0.238 0 1
power tool dummy: 1 if household owns power driven tool, e.g. electricity drill 0.131 0.337 0 1
Western Cape dummy: 1 if household residents in Western Cape province 0.128 0.334 0 1
Eastern Cape dummy: 1 if household residents in Eastern Cape province 0.128 0.334 0 1
Northern Cape dummy: 1 if household residents in Northern Cape province 0.051 0.220 0 1
Free State dummy: 1 if household residents in Free State province 0.097 0.296 0 1
KwaZulu-Natal dummy: 1 if household residents in KwaZulu-Natal province 0.127 0.333 0 1
North West dummy: 1 if household residents in North West province 0.112 0.315 0 1
Gauteng dummy: 1 if household residents in Gauteng province 0.115 0.319 0 1
Mpumalanga dummy: 1 if household residents in Mpumalanga province 0.093 0.290 0 1
Limpopo dummy: 1 if household residents in Limpopo province 0.150 0.357 0 1
a In March of 2011, USD 1= ZAR 6.90.b c denotes cent, ZAR 1= 100 cents.
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Table 5: Marginal effects, income and price elasticities from the 2PM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(A) Estimates from Entire Sample
Variable
Probit The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Delta-method Std. Err. Elasticity Std. Err. ElasticityBootstrap Std. Err.
ln(I) 0.030∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.397∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.427∗∗∗ (0.012)
ln(p) 0.183∗∗∗ (0.018) -1.121∗∗∗ (0.041) -0.188∗∗∗ (0.098)
constant 2.254∗∗∗ (0.182)
R2 0.3259
Observation 25 015 17 810 25 015
(B) Estimates from Primary Estimation Sample
Variable
Probit The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Delta-method Std. Err. Elasticity Std. Err. ElasticityBootstrap Std. Err.
ln(I) 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.432∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.011)
ln(p) 0.098∗∗∗ (0.011) -1.159∗∗∗ (0.042) -0.665∗∗∗ (0.072)
constant 2.123∗∗∗ (0.189)
R2 0.3530
Observation 16 851 15 903 16 851
(C) Estimates from Primary Estimation Sample with Controls
Variable
Probit The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Delta-method Std. Err. Elasticity Std. Err. ElasticityBootstrap Std. Err.
ln(I) 0.001 (0.002) 0.131∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.011)
ln(p) 0.119∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.888∗∗ (0.039) -0.305∗∗∗ (0.069)
constant 2.356∗∗∗ (0.195)
R2 0.5664
Observation 16 851 15 903 16 851
Panel A uses all households (N=25 015), while Panel B uses the primary estimation sample (N=16 851, which is the sample that
arises, when additional controls are incorporated); neither sets of regressions include controls other than price andincome (in their
natural log). Panel C uses the primary estimation sample (N=16 851), along with additional controls. Probit contains estimates of
the probability that a household purchases electricity, assuming normality. Dependent variable in OLS model is ln monthly electricity
expenditure. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 6: Average price paid by value of electricity expenditure
Y > 0 Y = 0 Y ≥ 0
p 80.69 77.46 80.51
N 15 903 948 16 851
Mean price given to households
separated by electricity expendi-
ture levels.
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Table 7: Average price paid by type of payment
Prepaid Conventional Indigent Total
p 81.23 77.82 67.16 80.51
N 13 543 3 222 86 16 851
Mean price given to households in different data
subsets.
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Table 8: Marginal effects from the 2PM.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable
Probit The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Delta-method Std. Err. Marginal eff ct Std. Err. Marginal effect Bootstrap Std. Err.
nonlinear∗ln(p) -0.006∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.018∗∗ (0.006)
fbe 0.016∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.224∗∗∗ (0.012) -0.132∗∗∗ (0.023)
√
Ygas 0.000 (0.002) 0.006 (0.006) 0.06 (0.014)
√
Yliquid 0.003 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) 0.019∗∗ (0.007)√
Ysolid 0.005∗ (0.002) -0.004 (0.004) 0.023∗ (0.011)
dgas 0.011 (0.038) 0.084 (0.094) 0.134 (0.210)
dliquid -0.026 (0.014) -0.085∗ (0.033) -0.207∗∗ (0.066)
dsolid -0.040∗∗ (0.014) 0.002 (0.031) -0.199∗∗ (0.067)
ln(hhsize) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.093∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.142∗∗∗ (0.017)
ln(room) 0.018∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.287∗∗∗ (0.023)
urban 0.024∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.078∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.193∗∗∗ (0.042)
traditional 0.006 (0.008) -0.070∗∗ (0.023) -0.038 (0.046)
informal -0.005 (0.007) 0.069∗∗ (0.024) 0.039 (0.043)
owner 0.014∗∗ (0.005) -0.135∗∗∗ (0.018) -0.059 (0.032)
pipe water 0.013∗ (0.006) -0.050∗∗ (0.017) 0.018 (0.034)
flush toilet -0.040∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.215∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.003 (0.040)
winter 0.002 (0.004) -0.002 (0.012) 0.007 (0.024)
summer -0.001 (0.004) -0.021 (0.012) -0.025 (0.023)
ln(age) 0.001 (0.006) 0.010 (0.016) 0.013 (0.031)
female -0.001 (0.004) -0.036∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.040 (0.020)
Coloured -0.009 (0.007) 0.180∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.124∗∗ (0.038)
Indian/Asian 0.034 (0.019) 0.479∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.620∗∗∗ (0.112)
White -0.009 (0.008) 0.485∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.415∗∗∗ (0.051)
primary -0.005 (0.007) 0.012 (0.017) -0.014 (0.037)
secondary -0.016∗ (0.007) 0.010 (0.018) -0.070 (0.038)
matric -0.010 (0.007) 0.026 (0.020) -0.025 (0.040)
matric plus -0.029∗∗ (0.009) 0.056 (0.028) -0.091 (0.054)
radio 0.008∗ (0.004) -0.003 (0.010) 0.035 (0.020)
stereo/HiFi 0.007 (0.004) 0.055∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.085∗∗∗ (0.023)
TV 0.012∗ (0.005) 0.099∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.153∗∗∗ (0.032)
DVD 0.004 (0.004) 0.050∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.068∗∗ (0.024)
refrigerator 0.022∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.169∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.267∗∗∗ (0.030)
stove 0.023∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.113∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.219∗∗∗ (0.034)
microwave 0.006 (0.005) 0.133∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.154∗∗∗ (0.027)
washing machine 0.001 (0.005) 0.124∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.123∗∗∗ (0.029)
computer -0.009 (0.006) 0.150∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.098∗∗ (0.034)
camera 0.003 (0.007) 0.063∗∗ (0.021) 0.072 (0.041)
cellphone 0.002 (0.006) 0.100∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.104∗∗ (0.033)
telephone -0.006 (0.006) 0.126∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.088∗ (0.036)
DStv 0.002 (0.005) 0.138∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.140∗∗∗ (0.031)
internet -0.013 (0.009) 0.061∗ (0.028) -0.009 (0.049)
power tool -0.002 (0.006) 0.072∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.057 (0.036)
Western Cape 0.062∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.078∗∗ (0.025) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.042)
Eastern Cape 0.046∗∗∗ (0.007) -0.200∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.041 (0.041)
Northern Cape 0.027∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.104∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.037 (0.052)
Free State 0.086∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.137∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.298∗∗∗ (0.047)
KwaZulu-Natal 0.068∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.180∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.506∗∗∗ (0.044)
North West 0.074∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.069∗∗ (0.024) 0.303∗∗∗ (0.046)
Mpumalanga 0.076∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.048∗ (0.024) 0.331∗∗∗ (0.047)
Limpopo 0.075∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.159∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.220∗∗∗ (0.051)
constant 2.356∗∗∗ (0.195)
R2 0.5664
Observation 16 851 15 903 16 851
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Figure 1: Proportion of consumer units receiving FBE servics over the period 2010 and 2011.
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Appendix A
Table A2: Marginal effects from the 2PM with additional controls of municipal-level means
of the independent variables
Variable
Probit The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Delta-method Std. Err. Marginal eff ct Std. Err. Marginal effect Bootstrap Std. Err.
ln(I) 0.003 (0.002) 0.121∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.011)
ln(I mean) -0.029∗∗ (0.011) 0.097∗∗ (0.031) -0.053 (0.070)
ln(p) 0.462∗∗∗ (0.022) -0.389∗∗∗ (0.105) 1.942∗∗∗ (0.169)
ln(p mean) -0.383∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.529∗∗∗ (0.116) -1.415∗∗∗ (0.187)
nonlinear∗ln(p) -0.019∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.031∗∗∗ (0.006) -0.066∗∗∗ (0.009)
nonlinear mean∗ln(p mean) 0.026∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.026∗∗ (0.008) 0.106∗∗∗ (0.014)
fbe 0.018∗∗∗ (0.004) -0.206∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.105∗∗∗ (0.025)
fbe mean -0.000 (0.013) -0.038 (0.036) -0.037 (0.083)
√
Ygas -0.001 (0.002) 0.005 (0.006) -0.000 (0.016)
√
Ygas mean -0.008∗∗ (0.003) 0.029∗∗∗ (0.008) -0.011 (0.016)
√
Yliquid 0.003∗ (0.002) 0.005 (0.003) 0.020∗∗ (0.007)
√
Yliquid mean -0.005∗ (0.002) -0.010 (0.006) -0.032∗∗ (0.012)
√
Ysolid 0.004∗ (0.002) -0.002 (0.004) 0.021 (0.010)
√
Ysolid mean 0.002 (0.003) -0.001 (0.007) 0.007 (0.016)
dgas 0.037 (0.035) 0.049 (0.094) 0.229 (0.232)
dgas mean 0.058 (0.147) -0.056 (0.452) 0.239 (0.799)
dliquid -0.026∗ (0.013) -0.115∗∗∗ (0.033) -0.241∗∗∗ (0.065)
dliquid mean 0.085 (0.058) 0.423∗∗ (0.158) 0.825∗ (0.335)
dsolid -0.038∗∗ (0.013) 0.002 (0.031) -0.188∗∗ (0.067)
dsolid mean -0.109 (0.062) -0.324∗ (0.161) -0.848∗ (0.374)
ln(hsize) 0.009∗∗ (0.003) 0.099∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.140∗∗∗ (0.017)
ln(hsizemean) -0.032 (0.026) 0.109 (0.073) -0.056 (0.171)
ln(room) 0.016∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.207∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.023)
ln(room mean) -0.001 (0.026) 0.164∗ (0.071) 0.150 (0.155)
urban 0.025∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.104∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.223∗∗∗ (0.047)
urban mean 0.010 (0.022) -0.065 (0.060) -0.013 (0.142)
traditional 0.015 (0.009) -0.092∗∗∗ (0.025) -0.011 (0.049)
traditional mean -0.075∗∗ (0.028) 0.131 (0.080) -0.252 (0.176)
informal 0.002 (0.007) 0.044 (0.024) 0.049 (0.041)
informal mean -0.008 (0.045) 0.318∗ (0.126) 0.263 (0.275)
owner 0.009 (0.005) -0.112∗∗∗ (0.019) -0.061 (0.032)
owner mean 0.023 (0.033) -0.250∗∗ (0.097) -0.122 (0.194)
pipe water 0.005 (0.007) -0.039∗ (0.019) -0.010 (0.037)
pipe watermean -0.007 (0.020) -0.034 (0.052) -0.068 (0.113)
flush toilet -0.038∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.232∗∗∗ (0.021) 0.029 (0.043)
... continued on next page ...
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Variable
Probit The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Delta-method Std. Err. Marginal eff ct Std. Err. Marginal effect Bootstrap Std. Err.
flush toiletmean 0.003 (0.022) -0.087 (0.063) -0.065 (0.154)
winter 0.002 (0.004) -0.004 (0.013) 0.004 (0.025)
winter mean 0.017 (0.018) 0.038 (0.047) 0.119 (0.107)
summer -0.001 (0.004) -0.010 (0.013) -0.016 (0.023)
summermean -0.019 (0.016) -0.104∗ (0.044) -0.196∗ (0.097)
ln(age) 0.004 (0.005) 0.009 (0.016) 0.029 (0.031)
ln(age mean) -0.047 (0.047) -0.098 (0.124) -0.327 (0.285)
female 0.000 (0.004) -0.032∗∗ (0.011) -0.030 (0.020)
femalemean -0.071∗ (0.031) -0.163 (0.088) -0.511∗∗ (0.190)
Coloured -0.011 (0.007) 0.234∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.039)
Colouredmean 0.021 (0.026) -0.247∗∗ (0.077) -0.129 (0.158)
Indian/Asian 0.021 (0.018) 0.487∗∗∗ (0.045) 0.562∗∗∗ (0.111)
Indian/Asian mean 0.021 (0.081) 0.227 (0.237) 0.321 (0.512)
White -0.010 (0.008) 0.511∗∗∗ (0.028) 0.430∗∗∗ (0.050)
White mean 0.161∗∗ (0.059) -0.039 (0.155) 0.769∗ (0.350)
primary -0.004 (0.007) -0.006 (0.018) -0.027 (0.037)
primary mean -0.084 (0.048) 0.173 (0.122) -0.254 (0.300)
secondary -0.009 (0.007) -0.010 (0.019) -0.053 (0.038)
secondmean -0.132∗∗ (0.046) -0.048 (0.121) -0.704∗ (0.289)
matric -0.004 (0.007) 0.002 (0.020) -0.016 (0.041)
matric mean -0.111∗ (0.047) 0.002 (0.123) -0.552∗ (0.272)
matric plus -0.020∗ (0.009) 0.027 (0.029) -0.073 (0.055)
matric plusmean -0.075 (0.090) 0.215 (0.233) -0.170 (0.465)
radio 0.008∗ (0.003) 0.003 (0.010) 0.045∗ (0.020)
radio mean 0.052∗ (0.021) -0.173∗∗ (0.060) 0.095 (0.134)
stereo/HiFi 0.004 (0.004) 0.052∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.068∗∗ (0.022)
stereo/HiFi mean 0.125∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.192∗ (0.075) 0.807∗∗∗ (0.181)
TV 0.014∗∗ (0.005) 0.090∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.153∗∗∗ (0.032)
TV mean -0.231∗∗∗ (0.054) 0.430∗∗ (0.138) -0.747∗ (0.316)
DVD 0.005 (0.004) 0.056∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.076∗∗ (0.024)
DVD mean -0.060 (0.045) -0.139 (0.118) -0.430 (0.271)
refrigerator 0.020∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.172∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.263∗∗∗ (0.030)
refrigerator mean 0.018 (0.045) -0.150 (0.126) -0.052 (0.270)
stove 0.021∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.107∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.207∗∗∗ (0.034)
stovemean 0.047 (0.039) -0.110 (0.102) 0.129 (0.233)
microwave 0.005 (0.005) 0.119∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.138∗∗∗ (0.026)
microwavemean 0.018 (0.042) 0.366∗∗ (0.113) 0.435 (0.266)
washing machine 0.003 (0.005) 0.115∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.123∗∗∗ (0.028)
washing machinemean -0.028 (0.040) 0.012 (0.110) -0.127 (0.236)
... continued on next page ...
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Variable
Probit The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Delta-method Std. Err. Marginal eff ct Std. Err. Marginal effect Bootstrap Std. Err.
computer -0.010 (0.006) 0.148∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.090∗∗ (0.034)
computermean 0.177∗ (0.071) -0.170 (0.180) 0.722 (0.400)
camera 0.002 (0.007) 0.065∗∗ (0.021) 0.072 (0.039)
cameramean -0.128 (0.068) -0.290 (0.199) -0.915 (0.471)
cellphone 0.002 (0.006) 0.092∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.098∗∗ (0.033)
cellphonemean 0.141∗∗ (0.047) 0.181 (0.132) 0.875∗∗ (0.291)
telephone -0.002 (0.006) 0.124∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.109∗∗ (0.034)
telephonemean -0.121∗ (0.051) 0.109 (0.136) -0.503 (0.321)
DStv 0.002 (0.005) 0.139∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.144∗∗∗ (0.030)
DStv mean 0.079∗ (0.037) -0.140 (0.098) 0.264 (0.208)
internet -0.014 (0.008) 0.073∗∗ (0.028) -0.000 (0.047)
internet mean -0.211 (0.113) -0.497 (0.293) -1.524∗ (0.636)
power tool 0.003 (0.006) 0.069∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.080∗ (0.035)
power toolmean -0.054 (0.047) -0.001 (0.129) -0.269 (0.306)
Western Cape 0.040∗ (0.016) -0.023 (0.047) 0.181 (0.093)
Eastern Cape 0.050∗∗∗ (0.013) -0.264∗∗∗ (0.039) -0.001 (0.078)
Northern Cape 0.028 (0.014) 0.024 (0.045) 0.164 (0.084)
Free State 0.031∗ (0.013) -0.210∗∗∗ (0.034) -0.043 (0.076)
KZN 0.062∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.445∗∗∗ (0.089)
North West 0.061∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.107∗∗ (0.031) 0.206∗∗ (0.064)
Mpumalanga 0.027∗ (0.011) -0.036 (0.031) 0.100 (0.063)
Limpopo 0.063∗∗∗ (0.014) -0.130∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.192∗ (0.089)
constant 1.580∗ (0.627)
R2 0.5759
Observation 16 851 15 903 16 851
meandenotes the mean value of corresponding variable. Dependent variable is lnY for the second-stage OLS. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
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Table A1: Comparison of the variable means.
Variable
Retained sample (N=16 851) Dropped sample (N=8 164)
Observation Mean Std. Dev Observation Mean Std. Dev
Y 16 851 225.352 335.153 8 164 54.105 188.873
I 16 851 8 396.801 13 501.620 8 164 7 531.617 13 653.720
p 16 851 80.506 11.144 8 164 79.805 12.193
nonlinear 16 851 0.318 0.466 8 164 0.468 0.499
fbe 16 851 0.283 0.450 5 209 0.171 0.377
Ygas 16 851 2.74 56.59 8 164 4.379 48.868
Yliquid 16 851 7.83 63.88 8 164 16.363 64.229
Ysolid 16 851 5.14 43.35 8 164 7.848 36.174
dgas 16 851 0.01 0.10 8 164 0.013 0.114
dliquid 16 851 0.08 0.28 8 164 0.188 0.390
dsolid 16 851 0.08 0.27 8 164 0.185 0.388
hsize 16 851 4.037 2.349 8 164 3.184 2.247
room 16 851 4.451 2.074 8 164 3.251 2.226
urban 16 851 0.628 0.483 8 164 0.676 0.468
formal 16 851 0.875 0.331 8 027 0.730 0.444
traditional 16 851 0.070 0.255 8 027 0.131 0.338
informal 16 851 0.055 0.228 8 027 0.139 0.346
owner 16 851 0.896 0.306 8 160 0.492 0.500
pipe water 16 851 0.867 0.340 8 144 0.788 0.409
flush toilet 16 851 0.595 0.491 8 059 0.612 0.487
winter 16 851 0.245 0.430 8 164 0.238 0.426
summer 16 851 0.275 0.446 8 164 0.249 0.432
age 16 851 48.390 15.913 8 164 47.703 15.782
female 16 851 0.459 0.498 8 164 0.387 0.487
African/Black 16 851 0.797 0.402 8 164 0.785 0.411
Coloured 16 851 0.115 0.319 8 164 0.093 0.291
Indian/Asian 16 851 0.015 0.120 8 164 0.026 0.160
White 16 851 0.074 0.261 8 164 0.096 0.294
no schooling 16 851 0.125 0.331 7 972 0.111 0.314
primary 16 851 0.271 0.444 7 972 0.264 0.441
secondary 16 851 0.329 0.470 7 972 0.331 0.470
matric 16 851 0.227 0.419 7 972 0.240 0.427
matric plus 16 851 0.048 0.213 7 972 0.054 0.226
radio 16 851 0.546 0.498 8 112 0.538 0.499
stereo/HiFi 16 851 0.301 0.459 8 029 0.204 0.403
TV 16 851 0.854 0.353 8 123 0.606 0.489
DVD 16 851 0.653 0.476 8 111 0.464 0.499
refrigerator 16 851 0.823 0.382 8 114 0.524 0.499
stove 16 851 0.908 0.289 8 116 0.811 0.392
microwave 16 851 0.479 0.500 8 102 0.327 0.469
washing machine 16 851 0.349 0.477 8 115 0.235 0.424
computer 16 851 0.166 0.372 8 081 0.147 0.354
camera 16 851 0.115 0.319 8 057 0.117 0.321
cellphone 16 851 0.907 0.290 8 091 0.871 0.335
telephone 16 851 0.142 0.349 8 083 0.097 0.296
DStv 16 851 0.229 0.420 8 086 0.158 0.364
internet 16 851 0.060 0.238 8 092 0.059 0.236
power tool 16 851 0.131 0.337 8 051 0.092 0.288
Western Cape 16 851 0.128 0.334 8 164 0.097 0.296
Eastern Cape 16 851 0.128 0.334 8 164 0.138 0.345
Northern Cape 16 851 0.051 0.220 8 164 0.041 0.198
Free State 16 851 0.097 0.296 8 164 0.063 0.243
KwaZulu-Natal 16 851 0.127 0.333 8 164 0.176 0.381
North West 16 851 0.112 0.315 8 164 0.075 0.264
Gauteng 16 851 0.115 0.319 8 164 0.232 0.422
Mpumalanga 16 851 0.093 0.290 8 164 0.088 0.284
Limpopo 16 851 0.150 0.357 8 164 0.088 0.284
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Table A3: Marginal effects from the 2PM with ln(Q) as dependent variable.
Independent variable
The second-stage OLS 2PM
Marginal effect Std. Err. Marginal effect Bootstrap Std. Err.
ln(I) 0.131∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.128∗∗∗ (0.011)
ln(p) -0.888∗∗∗ (0.039) -0.218∗∗ (0.073)
nonlinear∗ln(p) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) -0.020∗∗ (0.006)
fbe -0.224∗∗∗ (0.012) -0.128∗∗∗ (0.024)
√
Ygas 0.006 (0.006) 0.006 (0.014)
√
Yliquid 0.004 (0.003) 0.020∗∗ (0.007)√
Ysolid -0.004 (0.004) 0.024∗ (0.011)
dgas 0.084 (0.094) 0.137 (0.217)
dliquid -0.085∗ (0.033) -0.213∗∗ (0.069)
dsolid 0.002 (0.031) -0.209∗∗ (0.070)
ln(hsize) 0.093∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.018)
ln(room) 0.210∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.291∗∗∗ (0.024)
urban 0.078∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.199∗∗∗ (0.043)
traditional -0.070∗∗ (0.023) -0.036 (0.048)
informal 0.069∗∗ (0.024) 0.038 (0.045)
owner -0.135∗∗∗ (0.018) -0.055 (0.033)
pipe water -0.050∗∗ (0.017) 0.021 (0.035)
flush toilet 0.215∗∗∗ (0.019) -0.007 (0.041)
winter -0.002 (0.012) 0.008 (0.025)
summer -0.021 (0.012) -0.026 (0.024)
ln(age) 0.010 (0.016) 0.014 (0.032)
female -0.036∗∗∗ (0.011) -0.040 (0.021)
Coloured 0.180∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.122∗∗ (0.040)
Indian/Asian 0.479∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.628∗∗∗ (0.117)
White 0.485∗∗∗ (0.027) 0.412∗∗∗ (0.053)
primary 0.012 (0.017) -0.016 (0.039)
secondary 0.010 (0.018) -0.074 (0.040)
matric 0.026 (0.020) -0.028 (0.042)
matric plus 0.056 (0.028) -0.098 (0.056)
radio -0.003 (0.010) 0.037 (0.020)
stereo/HiFi 0.055∗∗∗ (0.012) 0.087∗∗∗ (0.024)
TV 0.099∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.156∗∗∗ (0.033)
DVD 0.050∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.069∗∗ (0.025)
refrigerator 0.169∗∗∗ (0.017) 0.273∗∗∗ (0.032)
stove 0.113∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.224∗∗∗ (0.035)
microwave 0.133∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.156∗∗∗ (0.028)
washing machine 0.124∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.124∗∗∗ (0.030)
computer 0.150∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.096∗∗ (0.036)
camera 0.063∗∗ (0.021) 0.073 (0.042)
cellphone 0.100∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.104∗∗ (0.034)
telephone 0.126∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.086∗ (0.037)
DStv 0.138∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.141∗∗∗ (0.032)
internet 0.061∗ (0.028) -0.013 (0.051)
power tool 0.072∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.057 (0.037)
Western Cape -0.078∗∗ (0.025) 0.250∗∗∗ (0.043)
Eastern Cape -0.200∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.053 (0.042)
Northern Cape -0.104∗∗∗ (0.029) 0.044 (0.054)
Free State -0.137∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.321∗∗∗ (0.049)
KwaZulu-Natal 0.180∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.524∗∗∗ (0.045)
North West -0.069∗∗ (0.024) 0.322∗∗∗ (0.048)
Mpumalanga -0.048∗ (0.024) 0.351∗∗∗ (0.049)
Limpopo -0.159∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.240∗∗∗ (0.053)
constant 6.962∗∗∗ (0.195)
R2 0.5785
Observation OLS: 15 903 2PM: 16 851
Q is estimated monthly electricity consumption in kWh, it is calculated by monthly electricity expen-
diture divided by matched electricity tariff. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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